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1. Landscapes of Spatiotemporal Crisis   
 
How should ecocriticism proceed when considering the apocalyptic landscapes of 
Ballard’s early tetralogy? The Wind from Nowhere (1962), The Drowned World 
(1962), The Drought (1964), and The Crystal World (1966) provide scenarios in 
which small groups of survivors struggle to adapt to radical and destructive 
environmental changes. While we can position these novels broadly within the 
disaster tradition of British science fiction as represented by John Wyndham, John 
Christopher and others, they stand apart from this field by featuring characters who 
accept their fate with unusual resignation, almost apathy. Ballard’s language often 
reflects the cold detachment of scientific discourse, but no technological fixes emerge 
in these narratives to resolve the respective ecological crises of devastating winds, 
melting icecaps, desertification, and the crystallisation of matter. Whatever heroism 
Ballard’s protagonists possess is to be found in their willingness to embrace the 
challenges posed by the catastrophe and attain a state of mind adequate to it.  
The dominant trend in scholarship (Pringle 1984; Luckhurst 1997; Francis 
2011) has been to follow Ballard’s own lead and to regard these landscapes as 
symbolic manifestations of psychological states or external realisations of ‘inner 
space’, but an ecocritical analysis cannot be satisfied with this. Indeed, it is 
increasingly difficult not to read these works ecologically and materially and in 
relation to our own climate emergency. An alternative trend has thus emerged in 
recent years showing an eagerness to attribute to Ballard a prescience with respect to 
concerns about environmental change. Amitav Ghosh (2016), for example, insists that 
Ballard was ‘one of the very few’ literary minds of the latter half of the 20th century 
‘alive to the archaic voice whose rumblings, once familiar, had now become inaudible 
to humanity: that of the earth and its atmosphere’ (124). Adam Trexler’s 
Anthropocene Fictions (2015) and a number of recent articles similarly regard the 
early novels as precursors, even progenitors, of climate fiction, a burgeoning category 
that has emerged in the last ten to fifteen years at the intersection of SF with 
mainstream popular and literary fiction (for a comprehensive survey see Johns-Putra 
2016). Adrian Tait argues that, ‘like the quartet of which it forms a part, the images 
conjured up in The Drowned World anticipate concerns that only years later formed 
themselves into a global discourse of environmental anxiety; this is “cli-fi” before 
climate change was understood’ (2014, 30). Jim Clarke is more sceptical about such 
anachronistic co-option, but nonetheless maintains that Ballard’s accounts of 
ecological collapse ‘transcend literature’ to provide iconic signifiers of climate crisis 
avant la lettre (2013, 20). 
The problem is that these readings risk placing Ballard within a 21st century 
environmentalist discourse that is, in fact, quite alien to his work’s real concerns and 
achievements. His ecoapocalyptic visions are strikingly indifferent to what we would 
recognise as a green awareness of the human impact on nature. Only one of the 
disasters described in the tetralogy—the one from The Drought—is anthropogenic. 
But even in that text, in which rainfall ceases due to industrial waste deposited in the 
oceans, the ethico-political issues surrounding human culpability and survival are 
ignored almost entirely. Instead, the desertification of the Earth is seen as a precursor 
to a more profound, if inscrutable, future. The rising global temperatures behind the 
deluges of The Drowned World, meanwhile, are attributed to freak solar storms and 
the resulting climatic changes in which London comes to resemble a tropical jungle 
are grasped in terms of a regression of conscious life to its evolutionary, 
‘archaeopsychic’ past (Ballard 2012b, 57). In the end, Ballard’s apocalypses are not 
prescient warnings about the impact of humanity on the biosphere but visionary and 
strangely gratifying solutions to conflicts between the organic and the technological, 
nature and society, matter and form. As Gregory Stephenson (1991) puts it in one of 
the earliest book length studies of Ballard, the elemental catastrophes of air, water, 
fire and earth are, like the subsequent visions of the traffic accident as sexual release 
in Crash (1973), ‘deeply desired by the unconscious’ (73). 
The challenge for contemporary criticism, then, is to navigate a path between 
the psychological and the environmental when it comes to understanding Ballard’s 
ecoapocalyptic texts. For Ballard himself, the role of landscape in fiction is related to 
a knotting together of the inner and the outer. He regarded his landscapes, like those 
of his great influences Dali and Ernst, as ‘formalisation[s] of space and time’ (Ballard 
2012a, 5). Space and time, Ballard suggests, aren’t mere external givens but 
resources, internally accessible potentialities that can be drawn on creatively through 
art (as through architecture and technology). If remaking space and time involves a 
catastrophic moment, then for Ballard’s era this was symbolised most emphatically by 
the atom bomb. The equivalent for us today is climate change. Nevertheless, the 
promise of a new spacetime retains a distinct utopianism for Ballard. The ecological 
transformations of the early novels are means of exploring the apocalyptic rupture 
implied in the construction of new spacetimes. Architecture and the visual art of 
landscape remained touchstones for Ballard because they can suggest new ways of 
allowing us to see and inhabit the world. At the same time, the older ways must 
dissolve, leading to a moment of crisis in which perception and action become subject 
to a strange stasis and the stakes of life and survival are suspended. A visionary 
attitude comes to dominate over action in Ballard’s apocalyptic texts, but this is a 
seeing in which what is witnessed is a transformation of space and time as the very 
conditions of perception itself. This is where a green reading of Ballard becomes 
inadequate. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen has defined green readings and their limitations in 
the following way:  
 
green readings have a tendency to reproduce … a split between nature and 
culture that founds a structurating antinomy even in the face of constitutive 
and intractable hybridities. Assuming such a split can lead to analyses 
stressing anthropocentric and detached concepts like stewardship, 
preservation, and prescriptive modes of environmental management. (Cohen 
2013, xx) 
 
Ballard’s ecocatastrophes deal precisely with the loss of the nature/culture distinction 
and with the unconsciously desired unravelling of that distinction as a structurating 
antinomy. This plays out less as an awareness of the mutual interactions of human and 
non-human agencies than a transformation of the human itself through the medium of 
ecological crisis. To this extent, Ballard retains an anthropocentrism, but one fully 
invested in an apocalyptic transition beyond the antinomies of culture and nature, 
organic and inorganic, etc. He is, likewise, less interested in the outcomes of such a 
transition than in the processes propelling us towards it.    
In this article, I pursue a non-green reading of The Crystal World as a 
narrative of spatiotemporal crisis and ecoaesthetic apocalypse. I read the novel 
alongside the American artist Robert Smithson, whose work suggests a number of 
important parallels with Ballard. Existing discussions of Ballard’s links with 
Smithson are curiously silent on their mutual fascination with the crystal, which 
becomes prominent as a guiding motif in Smithson’s work from the mid-60s until his 
death in 1972. Smithson’s article ‘The Crystal Land’ (1966) in particular suggests the 
influence of Ballard’s novel. Nevertheless, the influence went both ways, and while 
Ballard returned again and again to the Surrealist painters, Smithson was probably the 
visual artist closest to his work’s achievements. In both his art works and his writings, 
Smithson like Ballard used experimental landscapes to pursue new forms of space and 
time in ways that collapse distinctions between organic and inorganic, and natural and 
built environments.       
The catastrophe of crystallisation is undoubtedly the strangest of Ballard’s 
ecoapocalyptic tetralogy and the one in which the knotting of inner and outer space is 
pushed to its limit. The crystallisation process, originating in deep space, initially 
affects vegetation—and is thus thought to be some form of plant disease—but soon 
spreads to animals, people, and ultimately all matter. The process is detected as 
having overrun entire galaxies and is named the ‘Hubble Effect’ by the astronomers 
who first observe it. As in The Drowned World and The Drought, the narrative’s 
detailed descriptions of the landscape are interrupted by bursts of activity that drive 
the plot forward. Nevertheless, the task of survival is ultimately overwhelmed by the 
mysterious allure that the transformed environment exerts on Ballard’s characters. 
Unlike the prior books in the tetralogy, however, the nature of the catastrophic 
process is central to Ballard’s aesthetic concerns. While wind, deluge and 
desertification are mere occasions to reveal a dangerously transformed Earth, 
crystallisation springs directly from a new formalisation of space and time resulting 
from the appearance of what Ballard calls ‘anti-time’—a concept modelled on anti-
matter—which causes time to leak out of the universe. Matter is subsequently 
supersaturated and ‘effloresces’, creating duplicate images of itself at the sub-atomic 
level in order to compensate for the lost quanta of time. Crystallisation thus sees the 
emergence of matter without temporal duration or durability, ‘substance without 
mass’, as Sanders, Ballard’s doctor protagonist, puts it in a letter to a colleague: 
 
Just as a super-saturated solution will discharge itself into a crystalline mass, 
so the super-saturation of matter in our continuum leads to its appearance in a 
parallel spatial matrix. As more and more time “leaks” away, the process of 
super-saturation continues, the original atoms and molecules producing spatial 
replicas of themselves, substance without mass, in an attempt to increase their 
foot-hold upon existence. The process is theoretically without end, and it may 
be possible eventually for a single atom to produce an infinite number of 
duplicates of itself and so fill the entire universe. (Ballard 2011, 85)  
 
Crystallisation, then, is the proliferation of matter as pure image. Another character, 
also a doctor, describes the process as a kind of cancerous growth: ‘It’s as if a 
sequence of displaced but identical images of the same object were being produced by 
refraction through a prism, but with the element of time replacing the role of light’ 
(66). Sanders compares the crystallisation process to the viral propagation of leprosy 
and the crystalline nature of the virus itself (84). To the extent that Ballard’s narrative 
subordinates plot and character to a series of obsessively multiplied images of the 
catastrophe, the writing itself mirrors the crystallisation it describes. Just as the 
crystal grows through a reduplication of matter, the narrative progresses via the kinds 
of doubling and reflection created by the attempts of Ballard’s characters to interpret 
the signs of the crystal world they inhabit. The catastrophe, then, is both a material 
process and the loss of a stable material referent by which to pinpoint it. The crystal 
forest in which Sanders finds himself is a ‘forest of signs’ in which cultural, historical 
and psychological images metastasise in an unknown ecology. As Luckhurst (1997) 
has put it, ‘the crystallizing virus in the forest seems to attack reference itself’ (59). 
Crystallisation is, in other words, a material ecological event and a psychologically 
catastrophic loss of meaning to images spreading virally through the text.  
Existing readings of the novel by Pringle, Stephenson, Luckhurst, and Francis 
are dominated by Jungian and existential approaches by which the crystal is seen as a 
symbol of the individuation of the self. Gasiorek (2005), meanwhile, reads the novel, 
which references Wordsworth and Shelley, in the tradition of the Romantic sublime 
and insists on the crystal as a means of quasi-religious transcendence. Baxter (2009) 
insists on the novel as a postcolonial text inspired by the anti-imperialist politics of 
Surrealism. In all of these analyses, the material process of crystallisation as described 
by the sciences is more or less totally side-lined in favour of the crystal’s symbolic 
value. While I refer to physics, biology, and crystallography, my main theoretical 
reference points are the French biophilosophical tradition of Bergson, Simondon and 
Deleuze. The latter two use the crystal as a way of thinking about life that does not 
privilege the organic at the expense of the inorganic. Deleuze, in his work on cinema, 
combines Bergson and Simondon to develop notions of the ‘crystal image’ and 
‘crystalline narration’, which are deployed in my reading of The Crystal World in the 
final section. The biophilosophy of the crystal that Deleuze takes from Simondon 
enables him to theorise an aesthetics of spatiotemporal crisis. While Simondon offers 
what we might call a general ecology through the framework of the crystal, Deleuze 
extends this to analyses of perception, sensation, affect and images.     
  
2. Ballard, Smithson, and the Question of Entropy 
 
Ballard’s links to visual art and architecture are well known, but his relationship to 
Robert Smithson deserves more scrutiny. For one thing, Smithson’s extensive 
theoretical writings can help to illuminate the role of the built and natural 
environment in Ballard’s work. Smithson’s signature piece, Spiral Jetty (1970), is a 
1500-foot-long spiral strip constructed from black basalt at a remote point on the 
banks of the Great Salt Lake in Utah. It is generally seen as a key representative of 
land art, a movement that emerged out of minimalism and conceptualism in the 
1960s. In an essay on Spiral Jetty Smithson writes, in a language evocative of 
Ballard’s concern with the ‘archeopsychic’, that the site in Utah suggested the 
contemporaneousness of the deep past:  
 
An expanse of salt flats bordered the lake, and caught in its sediments were 
countless bits of wreckage. Old piers were left high and dry. The mere sight of 
the trapped fragments of junk and waste transported one into a world of 
modern prehistory. The products of a Devonian industry, the remains of a 
Silurian technology, all the machines of the Upper Carboniferous Period were 
lost in those expansive deposits of sand and mud. (Smithson 1996, 146) 
 
Smithson goes on to describe the jetty’s spiral tail as leading ‘into an undifferentiated 
state of matter’ (147). The work is a kind of time machine leading into the solvent of 
a primordial fluid: ‘Following the spiral steps we return to our origins, back to some 
pulpy protoplasm’ (148). The theme here is that of The Drowned World but also 
Ballard’s key early short story ‘The Voices of Time’ (1960), which Smithson 
mentions explicitly (343). In this text, Ballard is concerned with both biological de-
evolution and a sense of cosmic end time. Powers, a neurosurgeon, is struggling to 
understand an epidemic of narcolepsy while reviewing the work of his biologist 
colleague Whitby on genetic mutations linked to evolutionary regression. Kaldren, a 
former patient of Powers, occupies a large spiral-shaped house, built to model the 
square root of minus one, where he exhibits what he calls ‘Terminal Documents’, 
artefacts of modern society from the works of Beethoven and Freud to transcripts of 
the Nuremburg Trials. Kaldren picks up radio signals from the spiral galaxies of 
Canes Ventici that he interprets as a countdown to the end of the universe. As he tells 
Powers:  
 
The big spirals there are breaking up, and they’re saying goodbye … These 
are the voices of time, and they’re all saying goodbye to you. Think of 
yourself in a wider context. Every particle in your body, every grain of sand, 
every galaxy carries the same signature. (Ballard 2001, 256). 
       
Spiral Jetty, then, can be interpreted as what Smithson calls an ‘entropic landscape’ 
reflecting a Ballardian concern with problems of time, modernity, and degradation. In 
his essay ‘Entropy and the New Monuments’ (1966), Smithson describes the work of 
major minimalist sculptors such as Donald Judd and Dan Flavin as redolent of science 
fiction architectures and as providing ‘a visual analog for the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics’ (11). Entropy, here, is to be understood as the tendency towards 
increasing disorder and the loss of available energy, the outcome of which is a state of 
undifferentiated matter. Such a view of time runs counter to narratives of progress and 
evolution. The monumental sculpture of Judd, Flavin and others ‘are not built for the 
ages, but against the ages’ (11). Rather than suggesting the stages of human history, 
they suggest the manifestation in the present of a kind of eternity that is not spiritual 
but monumental: ‘past and future are placed into an objective present. This kind of 
time has little or no space; it is stationary and without movement, it is going nowhere, 
it is anti-Newtonian … time becomes place minus motion’ (11). A radical new 
spatiotemporal condition is suggested by the new monuments of minimalist sculpture, 
one that is resolutely non-biological and non-organic: ‘Time as decay or biological 
evolution is eliminated by many of these artists’ (11).  
Existing accounts of the links between Smithson and Ballard (Finklestein 
1987 and Tsai 1988) focus on their concern with entropy but ignore the conception of 
an inorganic spacetime that Smithson sees in the art of the 60s. As Ballard himself 
wrote, ‘Smithson’s monuments … [are] artefacts intended to serve as machines that 
will suddenly switch themselves on and begin to generate a more complex time and 
space’ (1997, 31). Fredric Jameson, in his reading of ‘The Voices of Time’, suggests 
that Ballard’s spiral constructs and notions of cosmic decline were indicative of a 
general shift towards the postmodern across the arts by which spatiality began to take 
precedence over older views of temporality and history: 
 
Ballard’s pathos of entropy is … the affect released by the minute, and not 
unenthusiastic, exploration of this whole new world of spatiality, and the sharp 
pang of the death of the modern that accompanies it. At any rate, from this 
nostalgic and regressive perspective—that of the older modern and its 
temporalities—what is mourned is the memory of deep memory; what is 
enacted is a nostalgia for nostalgia, for the grand older extinct questions of 
origin and telos, of deep time and the Freudian Unconscious. (1991, 156)       
 
Entropy here is seen as indicative of a loss of time as available energy, memory, 
continuity, possibility, novelty, and historical development, all of which give way to 
the spatial condition of postmodernity and instantaneous consumer capitalism. A 
concern with deep time, of the kind we see in Smithson and Ballard, is only the 
ideological manifestation of the loss of a sense of historical reality. In this way, 
Jameson ultimately deflates Ballard’s apocalyptic vision and reads his disaster 
narratives as meditations on the end of the British Empire (Jameson 2005, 288).  
We can agree with Jameson that the role of entropy in Ballard and others 
signals a new concern with spatiality and a break with older models of time. But 
Jameson’s conceptions of ideology and history prevent him from taking seriously 
Ballard’s utopian claim, inspired by Smithson’s work, that art can be a machine for 
producing new spacetimes. It is thus possible to read the role of entropy in Smithson 
and Ballard quite differently than Jameson does, and in a more positive and utopian 
sense than is generally done. Art and literature are capable of fabricating new sets of 
spatiotemporal conditions of perception that break with historical continuity. This 
does not necessarily entail the loss of the grand temporal questions of the 19th and 
early 20th century but a transformation of them beyond the organic model of time. For 
Smithson, entropy signals the end of ‘organic time’ but, crucially, also grants access 
to an inorganic time beyond what he calls the ‘biological metaphor’, by which he 
means the tendency to view all action in terms of ‘the “useful” time of organic 
(active) duration’ (35). The biological metaphor distorts our understanding of our 
relationship with the environment by imposing a vitalistic evolutionary framework: 
‘biological science has since the nineteenth century infused in most people’s minds an 
unconscious faith in “creative evolution”. An intelligible dissatisfaction with this faith 
is very much in evidence in the work of certain artists’ (35-6). Smithson’s use of 
geological landscapes and inorganic materials, most notably crystals, are the main 
ways he achieves a break from organic time in his art. Installation pieces such as Non-
Sites (1968) present gravel and rubble taken from New Jersey stone quarries, mines 
and derelict zones accompanied by maps and photographs. Untitled (1964-65), a 
crystal-shaped steel and Plexiglas sculpture with blue faces and a pink frame, is one 
of a number of sculptural works that explore space and light through crystalline and 
prismatic forms. The painted steel and chrome modules of Cryosphere (1966) are 
hexagonal lattices inspired by ice crystals (Smithson 1996, 197).   
Smithson’s reading of crystallography texts such as Charles Bunn’s Crystals: 
Their Role in Nature and Science (1964) was key to the development of his work 
because it offered an inorganic model for thinking the accumulation of form (Roberts 
2004, 40). Crystals ‘grow’, but through a relatively autonomous accretion of layers 
that is susceptible to changes or ‘dislocations’. One example of this, the ‘screw 
dislocation’, gives rise to spiral structures. As Bunn writes: 
 
Molecules readily add onto the edges of layers, and if this happens on the edge 
of the step formed by a screw dislocation, it can go on happening indefinitely; 
the layer is never completed, and the crystal, so to speak, grows ‘up a spiral 
staircase’. (45) 
 
Growth here is molecular rather than molar, following additions or layers that are 
always incomplete and indefinite and that proceed from the edges rather than from a 
centre. Spiral Jetty appears inspired by this model of crystal growth in which each 
layer is added fractally to the one adjacent to it. Smithson writes of the salt crystals in 
the lake:  
 
each cubic salt crystal echoes the Spiral Jetty in terms of the crystal’s 
molecular lattice. Growth in a crystal advances around a dislocation point, in 
the manner of a screw. The Spiral Jetty could be considered one layer within 
the spiraling crystal lattice, magnified trillions of times. (147)  
 
The crystal’s molecular growth implicates different orders of scale in a way that 
‘dislocates’ the centrality of an observer in a landscape.  
Smithson’s text ‘The Crystal Land’ (1966) suggests the necessity to move 
beyond the confines of the gallery space and to work directly in the environment, but 
it also collapses the natural and the cultural, the organic and inorganic, into one 
another. The piece describes a trip to a New Jersey stone quarry with Judd, who 
shared an enthusiasm for geology and mineralogy. The mineral forms that Judd’s 
sculptures call to mind suggest the contours of an arid, cracked, bleached and 
fragmented landscape, a place in which organic time has been used up and is giving 
way to something else. In a moment of subdued apocalypticism, the motorways, 
middle-income homes, and diners come to manifest the same crystalline quality (8). 
If, as W.J.T. Mitchell (1994) puts it, landscape as an aesthetic category has 
traditionally been ‘a medium of exchange between the human and the natural, the self 
and the other’, then the crystal land presents these oppositions as exhausted and 
susceptible to the kinds of derangement of scale at work in Spiral Jetty (Mitchell, 5). 
Something similar happens in Ballard’s novel: the crystal motif extends from the level 
of the virus to the forest to cosmic dimensions.   
 
3. The Crystal and Inorganic Life 
 
The crystal has played a significant role in 20th century art history. It has featured as a 
key motif in Breton’s account of Surrealism (Breton 1978, 162-3), in Bauhaus 
architecture (Taylor 1992, 121), and in Wilhelm Worringer’s influential art historical 
text Abstraction and Empathy (1908). Writing on the role of the crystal in art and 
philosophy, Mark Cheetham (2013) observes that ‘crystals are compelling because 
they are indexical of existential questions, poised at the crossing of life and death. 
While their perfect forms appear lifeless, they suggest life because they “grow” and 
move’ (251). In the sciences, meanwhile, the crystal has been of singular importance 
for 20th century understandings of life, and in particular for interrogating the border 
between the organic and the inorganic. Ernst Haeckel—the German scientist and artist 
who coined the term ‘ecology’—published Crystal Souls: Studies in Inorganic Life in 
1917. Haeckel’s book, inspired by the discovery by Otto Lehmann of liquid crystals 
13 years earlier, articulated a biophilosophy of inorganic matter. As Spyros 
Papapetros (2016) writes, for Haeckel ‘since liquid crystals exhibited signs of 
irritability and movement, it meant they had a soul—a crystal soul—and since they 
had a soul, they were also living’ (87). Such a conclusion leads beyond science to a 
philosophical vision of all matter as actually or potentially living: for Haeckel, 
Papapetros continues, ‘all matter had force and energy. In the organic, this force was 
active; in the inorganic, it was latent yet potent, and much more potent, in fact, than 
what we call living’ (87). 
Erwin Schrödinger in What is Life? (1944), anticipating somewhat the 
discoveries of Crick and Watson, described the chromosome as an ‘aperiodic solid’, 
that is, a molecule with the solidity of crystal but with the capacity to break the 
‘periodic’ regularity of crystalline structures. The chromosome’s molecular code is 
formed from simple repeating patterns like a crystal’s, even though the resulting 
diversity of biological life is anything but simple or repetitive. The organism is thus 
like a crystal, were crystals less ‘plain and dull’. The difference between crystals and 
organisms is the difference between ‘ordinary wallpaper in which the same pattern is 
repeated again and again in regular periodicity and a masterpiece of embroidery, say a 
Raphael tapestry’ (Schrödinger 1992, 5). Schrödinger’s reference to art obfuscates 
more than it clarifies. Are crystals like organisms or are organisms like crystals? For 
Schrodinger, it would appear to be the latter: organisms are like crystals in that they 
have a durable consistency of structure (or symmetry) that seems to resist the entropic 
tendency to disorder. But simultaneously, crystals are unlike organisms in the same 
way that a piece of boring wallpaper is, precisely because of this same degree of 
ordered regularity, unlike a Raphael tapestry. A recourse to aesthetic judgment is 
required by Schrödinger to deny the possibility of inorganic life that the crystal 
suggests.     
If we look to the work of French philosopher Gilbert Simondon, we find the 
analogy of the crystal applied to biological life but in an entirely inverse fashion. 
Simondon’s book L’lndividu et sa genèse physico-biologique (1964) provides a 
theory of what he calls the ‘individuation’ of living beings in a way that does not 
judge the inorganic against the organic but rather gives an account of ontogenesis 
capable of explaining—instead of presupposing—the differences between organic and 
inorganic beings. His theory of individuation is part of a French biophilosophical 
tradition associated with Henri Bergson in the first half of the 20th century and Gilles 
Deleuze in the latter half. Bergson’s Creative Evolution (1907)—hugely popular in its 
day—challenged the Darwinian model of evolution by arguing for the existence of an 
‘élan vital’ or vital principle by which life not only adapts to its environment but is 
propelled creatively through its diverse forms. Despite Simondon’s debts to Bergson, 
he departs from the latter’s vitalism, which tends towards mysticism in its account of 
life as a creative force irreducible to matter. From a Simondonian perspective, 
Bergson’s creative evolutionism fails to escape from a certain conception, dating back 
to Aristotle’s De Anima, of life as a conjunction of indeterminate, non-living matter 
(hyle) and a determining, animating form (Ansell-Pearson 1999). This ‘hylomorphic’ 
view is critiqued by Simondon because it denies the possibility of matter self-
organising contingently and for beings to come into being—to become—according to 
dynamics latent within matter itself. Instead of relating an already-constituted 
individual being back to some prior schema (such as the hylomorphic conjunction of 
matter and form or a genetic code), we should view beings as self-constituting and 
indissociable from their becoming or individuation in a wider environment of 
transindividuation.   
Simondon’s favoured example of how individuation works is the formation of 
crystals, and it is in this respect that he offers an account of the relationship between 
crystals and organisms that is the inverse of Schrodinger’s. For the latter, the 
chromosome’s code contains ‘the entire pattern of the individual’s future 
development’ just as a crystal is formed from a small number of repeating 
configurations (Schrodinger 1992, 21). For Simondon, however, the crystal provides a 
paradigm for thinking organic life precisely because beings become in a way that is 
not determined in advance. His ontology of the genesis of individual beings (organic 
or inorganic) emphasises individuation as a process of becoming that is not 
preformed.  
There is, in reality, no such thing as a fully constituted or realised individual 
since individuation involves contingent, on-going actualisations of potentials. These 
potentials constitute what Simondon calls a ‘preindividual state’ or field which 
accompanies individuals as their potentiality: ‘individuation does not exhaust in the 
single act of its appearance all the potentials embedded in the preindividual state’ 
(Simondon 1992, 300). The preindividual coexists with the individual as its condition. 
The formation of crystals offers Simondon one of his key recurring examples of 
individuation in this sense. Crystals form out of a disturbance in what are known as 
‘supersaturated’ solutions. Supersaturated solutions are both amorphous and unstable 
and the crystal forms as a partial resolution to this instability. This process involves an 
entropic tendency towards equilibrium, but the crystal can be regarded as being in a 
metastable (as opposed to stable) equilibrium as long as it continues to individuate. 
Just as a crystal precipitates from an unstable solution, so an individual forms a 
metastable (partial) resolution of a preindividual field. All individuations, then, occur 
at a limit point between relative internal and external domains: 
 
the crystal’s genesis … would allow us to grasp, on the macroscopic level, a 
phenomenon that is rooted in those states of the system belonging to the 
microphysical domain, molecular and not molar. It would manage to grasp 
that activity which is at the very boundary of the crystal in the process of 
formation. Such an individuation is not to be thought of as the meeting of a 
previous form and matter existing as already constituted and separate terms, 
but a resolution taking place in the heart of a metastable system rich in 
potentials: form, matter and energy pre-exist in the system. … At the same 
time that a quantity of energy … is actualized, a portion of matter is 
organized. (Simondon 1992, 304) 
 
Form, matter, and energy pre-exist but in a particular way: not as a pattern to be 
realised but as a potential or (as Deleuze would say, following Bergson) a virtual 
condition for the individual’s actualisation in contingent encounters. This is the case 
with a crystal, which develops at the frontier between its surfaces and the solution: 
‘beginning as a tiny seed, [a crystal] grows and extends itself in all directions in its 
mother-water. Each layer of molecules that has been constituted serves as the 
structuring basis for the layer that is being formed next’ (313). This manner of 
accreting form, which Simondon calls ‘transduction’, involves a progressive iteration 
in which every actualisation forms a new condition for subsequent ones. New 
conditions are thus constantly produced. Metastability and transduction thus provide 
Simondon with the terms of a general ecology of relations. This allows us to assert an 
ecology of becoming that is not structured by an opposition of organic and inorganic 
but that remains sensitive to differences of scale (i.e. molecular and molar). In my 
reading of The Crystal World, I draw on Deleuze’s notion of ‘crystalline narration’ 
and show some of the aesthetic implications of Simondon’s theory of becoming as 
transduction. I suggest that it is possible to view space and time as elements of a 
preindividual field, which perceptions and sensations individuate or formalise.  
 
4. Ballard, Deleuze, and Crystalline Narration 
 
Ballard’s text begins with Powers, a doctor from a leper hospital, making his way by 
river steamer towards the town of Mont Royal, located amongst forest and jungle in 
the Cameroon. Mont Royal is the site of a French-owned mining settlement steeped in 
an atmosphere of colonial violence. Ballard refers to an ‘abortive coup’ by rebels to 
take over the diamond mines (Ballard 2011, 12). Powers’ motives are from the outset 
described as ‘ambiguous’ and obscure even to him, but are related to a married 
woman, Suzanne Clair, with whom he has had an affair and who is now stationed at a 
clinic near Mont Royal. Sanders carries with him an enigmatic letter from Suzanne 
that obliquely references the crystallisation process: 
 
The forest is the most beautiful in Africa, a house of jewels. I can barely find 
words to describe our wonder each morning as we look out across the slopes, 
still half-hidden by the mist but glistening like St. Sophia, each bough a 
jewelled semi-dome. Indeed, Max says I am becoming excessively 
Byzantine—I wear my hair to my waist even at the clinic, and affect a 
melancholy expression, although in fact for the first time in many years my 
heart sings! (18) 
 
The irony of Ballard’s spectacle of crystallisation—in which a whole European 
tradition of art and architecture seems to recapitulate itself in the West African 
landscape—is that an art historical framework is used to indicate a process whereby 
time is consumed by a metastasizing anti-time. This is not indicative of a mere loss of 
history to the atemporality of the image, as a Jamesonian reading would have it, but of 
a new discovery of time beyond the historical dead end of the 20th century, during 
which European religious and aesthetics traditions culminated in the bloodshed or war 
and imperialism. The crystal thus reclaims time from an exhausted European 
tradition. Sanders suggests at one point that the appeal of baroque design is that it 
contains 
 
a greater ambient time, providing that unmistakable premonition of 
immortality sensed within St. Peter’s or the palace at Nymphenburg. By 
contrast, the architecture of the twentieth century, characteristically one of 
rectangular unornamented façades, of simple Euclidean space and time, was 
that of the New World, confident of its firm footing in the future and 
indifferent to those pangs of mortality which haunted the mind of old Europe. 
(148) 
 
If the tradition of European (Christian) art and architecture culminates in the 
‘Euclidean’ spacetime of a 20th century spatiality overly confident in its own future, 
then crystallisation stages an apocalyptic synthesis of the past with the present that 
offers us a new spatiotemporal reality. As the priest Balthus tells Sanders as the 
crystallisation of the forest nears completion: ‘In this forest we see the final 
celebration of the Eucharist of Christ’s body. Here everything is transfigured and 
illuminated, joined together in the last marriage of space and time’ (162). Ideas of 
Christian eschatology, Romantic sublime, and psychological self-realisation all 
suggest themselves in this union with the forest. But by drawing on Simondon’s use 
of the crystal as an ecological paradigm, we can read the novel as in terms of a 
suspension of the biological metaphor. Inorganic life becomes perceptible only 
through a crisis of the organic. For Ballard, as for the scientists and philosophers 
discussed above, the crystal suggests an ambiguous point on the threshold of the 
living and the non-living. This is what links the crystal to the leprosy virus which, as 
Sanders puts it in a letter to a colleague, leads a ‘semi-animate, crystalline existence, 
half in and half out of our own time-stream’ (84). The crystal forest is a vision of the 
world seen according to the same uncertain state that characterises the life of the 
virus.  
Corresponding to this apocalypse of the organic is a crisis of action and 
perception. Ballard’s narrative is structured around a central opacity of motivation: 
Sanders can never articulate fully why he wants a union with the forest except in 
terms of a paralyzing fascination. While this is typical of a Ballard narrative, we can 
relate it to what Deleuze has called ‘crystalline narration’. In his comparison of 
cinema before and after the Second World War, Deleuze noted a new propensity for 
what he called ‘time-images’ in the work of Orson Welles, Italian neo-realism, and 
the French New Wave. Such images, he argues, break with action and traditional 
narrative continuity. He relates this to the violence of the War and ‘a shattering of the 
sensory-motor schema … which had linked perceptions, affections and actions’, but 
also to Bergson, for whom time is a distinct domain independent of matter and 
movement. This autonomy of time justifies the conception of an élan vital by which 
life is irreducible to matter. In Deleuze’s reading, this leads less towards mysticism 
than a new understanding of time adequate to a new (20th century) awareness of 
spatiality because it allows us to think the actuality of matter and movement alongside 
a virtuality with which it coexists. Every image of the actual as being-present is 
accompanied by images of the virtual as a ‘pure past’, a temporality that is never 
actualised as present but always accompanies the present as its condition of 
possibility. The present passes only because it has a past to pass into. Post-War 
cinema, by breaking with action and narrative continuity, gives us a direct image of 
time as the coexistence of past and present. Deleuze, drawing on Simondon alongside 
Bergson, discerns a class of cinematic images that he calls a ‘crystal images’, in 
which actual and virtual spacetimes are shown as coexisting:  
 
Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we see in the crystal. … 
In fact the crystal constantly exchanges the two distinct images which 
constitute it, the actual image of the present which passes and the virtual 
image of the past which is preserved: distinct and yet indiscernible, and all the 
more indiscernible because distinct, because we do not know which is one and 
which is the other. (Deleuze 1989, 81)   
 
In Simondonian terms, the present the image gives us is an individuation of a state of 
affairs, but there are also images of preindividual states that both co-exist with and 
condition the process of individuation. This is what Deleuze sees in certain examples 
of post-War cinema—such as the hall of mirrors scene in Welles’ The Lady from 
Shanghai (1948)—but the obsessively multiplied images of crystallisation in 
Ballard’s novel are also crystal-images in this sense because they combine states of 
the past (a worn-out European aesthetic tradition) with a present actualisation in 
which the possibility of action as temporal continuity (the sensory-motor schema) is 
leaking out of the universe. Ballard’s crystal images figure a catastrophic shattering of 
organic time precisely by illuminating a living present insusceptible to temporal 
continuity, action, or resolution. For Deleuze, post-War cinema likewise shatters the 
temporality of action and plot and he argues that we can, as a result, oppose ‘organic 
narration’ to ‘crystalline narration’. While the former ‘consists of the development of 
sensory-motor schemata as a result of which the characters react to situations or act in 
such a way as to disclose the situation’, crystalline narrative  
 
implies a collapse of sensory-motor schemata. Sensory-motor situations have 
given way to pure optical and sound situations to which characters, who have 
become seers, cannot or will not react, so great is their need to ‘see’ properly 
what there is in the situation. (128) 
 
Crystalline narrative works not by the continuity of lived experience but by shattering 
Euclidean spacetime. Concrete space thus ‘ceases to be organized according to 
tensions and resolutions of tension, according to goals, obstacles, means, or even 
detours’ (128-9). Ballard’s novel does, certainly, contain goals, obstacles and so forth, 
but these ultimately exist only to document a transition from the organic to the 
crystalline regime, from action to ‘seeing’.  
Ballard’s final instalment in his tetralogy, then, is a narrative whose dynamics 
mirror the materiality of the ecological catastrophe itself. Crystallisation suspends 
organic time through a series of proliferating images of entropic stasis, but entropy 
here should not be understood as the end of all novelty. Rather, by suspending the 
organic time of action, Ballard suggests a reclamation of time from the dead end of 
20th century history, whose terminal point is the Euclidean spacetime of modern 
architecture. The narrative plunders Western art history in order to offer up an 
ecoapocalyptic vision of a new spacetime. The ecology of the crystal thus leads us 
beyond the antinomies of nature and culture, organic and inorganic, vital and 
technological. For Ballard, these antinomies become sites of antagonism and generate 
a crisis of spatiality in which inner or psychic space appears in the form of an external 
reality shaped by libidinal and technological impulses. This is the terrain of his great 
urban dystopias of the 1970s, in which media images take on a deathly and seductive 
role, displacing the element of ecological transformation. Nevertheless, the 
dystopianism of novels such as The Atrocity Exhibition and Crash may best be 
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